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Abstract
What is the place of authority and what effects does it have on the behavior of 
individuals? This has historically been a question addressed in social psychology 
literature (see Milgram, 1963; Zimbardo, 1974; 2007). Traditionally researchers in this 
paradigm focus on the situational effects of assigned authority on underling positions in 
asymmetric power structure settings (e.g. the “teacher” and “learner” in Milgram, 1963). 
The current study sought to place focus on the individual in the authority role while 
engaged in a cooperative pay-off game. Thirty-eight students (N = 38) were recruited to 
participate in two trials of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) consisting of 20 rounds 
each for a total of 40 rounds. In between the two trials, participants completed three 
models in a Lego construction communication task. There were two conditions for the 
Lego task -  a cooperative and non-cooperative condition. In the cooperative condition, 
participants were instructed to cooperate with their partner to complete the task; in the 
non-cooperative condition, participants were told to dictate instructions to the builder . 
Participants competed in the PDG and worked on the Lego task with a confederate posing 
as a naive participant. It was hypothesized that those in the cooperative condition would 
show a decrease in defecting in the PDG from Trial 1 to Trial 2, whereas the non- 
cooperative condition would show an increase in defecting. The results did not support 
this hypothesis, but there was a significant increase in overall defecting from Trial 1 to 
Trial 2 of the PDG. Possible reasons for this increase are discussed.
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Cooperation of Authority
Over the past half-century, the concepts of authority and cooperation have 
intensely interested social psychologists, whether studied independently or together. 
Authority, and response to authority (either defiance or obedience), is a staple of any kind 
of society (Milgram, 1963). In many cases, authorities may be considered representative 
of a greater group, making them representatives of collective wellbeing (de Cremer & 
Tyler, 2007). Milgram (1963), however, showed the darker side of authority and 
cooperation, effectively demonstrating the coercive effect of the presence of an authority 
figure (see Burger (2009) for replication). These findings make sense in a broader 
societal context, as the goal of authority is often to motivate citizens to both comply and 
cooperate (Tyler & Jackson, 2014). It is of note, however, that Haslam and Reicher 
(2012) do contest that the case for blind obedience in the Milgram study has been 
overstated. Shedding light on this claim, Burger et al. (2011) has suggested, through post­
interview analyses following the Milgram study replication that the degree to which one 
accepts responsibility affects the degree of obedience. In other words, a sense of personal 
responsibility may be the main mediating factor in reducing destructive obedience in 
individuals. The current study seeks to elucidate this phenomenon of authority even 
further by viewing it from a completely different perspective -  from that of the authority 
figure.
Authority, as discussed here, can either be dispositional or situational in nature. 
Viewed in the dispositional light, Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950) 
provides another view of how authority functions. Those people that possess an 
Authoritarian Personality are more likely to support and bring to power any kind of
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strong figure as a leader. This is done for fear of outgroups and as an existential 
mechanism to avoid freedom (Komyeyeva & Boehnke, 2013). Li et al. (2012), working 
within the context of Chinese power structures, discuss how previously sampled public 
servants are more likely to possess an Authoritarian Personality, lending them a more 
rigid view of rules and morality. This theoretical framework of personality seeks to 
explain the rise of tyrannical rule in varying social strata.
Additionally, there is a situational aspect of authority aside from the dispositional 
dimension. As Zimbardo (1974; 2007) has researched and discussed, situational and 
vocational factors often precipitate authoritative actions of aggression. Viewed in this 
light, authority can theoretically be “switched on” by mere cues (for instance, an assigned 
role of prison guard in Zimbardo’s case). The situational type of authority is the main 
interest of the current study for three reasons: first, researchers can contrive and 
manipulate situational authority with greater ease than dispositional, lending itself to 
experimentation; second, the effect of interest, barring any moderating variables, should 
affect most people the same way; third, as explained by Zimbardo (2007), it is the 
situational aspect of authority that can be the most stealthy and nefarious in a global 
sense (e.g. Abu Ghraib). Thus, the situational construct is easier to consistently study, 
applicable to everyday situations, and of real world importance for its implications.
Though ostensibly a tool for tyrannical abuse when viewed under the paradigms 
detailed above, cooperation has a good side as well. For example, it expedites many tasks 
and makes them more enjoyable (de Cremer & Tyler, 2007). Cooperation can be studied 
on many levels, ranging from social games to psycholinguistic tasks where grounding, or 
establishing gradual mutual understanding between two people occurs (Clark & Krych,
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2004). As stated by Pothos et al. (2011), cooperation to the degree witnessed in the 
human species is an anomaly in nature; most other organisms do not engage in the costly 
(and sometimes endangering) cooperative behavior that humans display on a regular 
basis.
For the purposes of quantifying and examining cooperation in a dyadic setting, 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) offers a testable avenue of research. First 
developed within the discipline of economic game theory (Flood, 1958), the PDG is a 
simulated setting to examine a person’s cooperative/prosocial behavior in a zero-sum 
game setting. Two people play in the game with a pre-determined number of rounds. 
Every round, each play has two choices: cooperate or defect. If both players cooperate, 
they split the earnings; if one defects and the other cooperates, the defecting party takes 
all; and if both defect, both gain nothing.
Several factors that influence strategy in the PDG have been researched in the 
literature on cooperation and competition. Ingram and Berger (1977) discuss how gender 
may affect how individuals engage in strategy in a zero-sum game. They discuss the 
surprising finding across some studies that female pairs tend to be more competitive and 
show higher rates of defecting. The authors theorize that male strategy tends to focus on 
maximizing gains, whereas female strategy tends to focus on defensive playing. Thus, as 
the game moves along, women seem more likely to become deadlocked in defecting, a 
phenomenon known as Nash Equilibrium (Khadjavi & Lange, 2013). Recently, however, 
Balliet et al. (2011) performed a meta-analysis of social game research over the past half- 
century, focusing on effect sizes in gender difference findings. Across 272 effect sizes 
from 203 articles using social dilemma games (most utilizing the PDG), the authors
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found essentially no difference between men and women in cooperation, though small 
effects were found indicating that men tend to cooperate more in same-gender dyads and 
women more in mixed-gender dyads.
Certain individual difference components may also influence cooperative strategy 
within the PDG. For example, Pothos et al. (2011) analyzed personality components 
related to the Behavioral Approach System and Behavioral Inhibition system and altered 
payoff matrices of the PDG to incentivize either cooperation or defecting; they found a 
strong predicting factor in the Behavioral Approach System to be the Reward 
Responsiveness trait, defined as the extent to which one gleans pleasure from positive 
rewards (Taubitz et al., 2015). Participants high on this trait were more likely to defect 
when it was incentivized and they were privy to the moves of a dummy opponent.
Despite predictions of cooperation bias, the researchers found that defecting was just as 
easy to incentivize as cooperation with varying payoff matrices. This indicates 
participants were not as willing to cooperate at the outset of the game as thought 
previously.
Another interesting characteristic that can influence strategy in social games is 
Machiavellianism, or the extent to which one is willing to use others as a means to some 
desirable end (Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014). Using the Public Good Game (another social 
game wherein participants determine how much money to put into a public account when 
playing with others) and Mach-IV personality index, the researchers found that high 
Machiavellian participants donated less money to the group and ended the game with 
higher gains due in large part to lack of cooperative tendencies. Findings such as these 
demonstrate the manner in which key personality traits (e.g. Reward Responsiveness and
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Machiavellianism) can influence the strategies individuals choose to use in experimental 
games.
The paradigm up until now, as discussed earlier, has been to focus how one 
cooperates with an authority figure, or obeys. This should be differentiated from equal 
cooperation, which is a prosocial contribution of energy/resources or helping behavior 
dedicated to bettering a group (de Cremer & Tyler, 2007). Interestingly enough, little 
work has been conducted examining cooperative behaviors on the part of the 
authoritative figure herself. The current study seeks to flip the role of interest around 
from the underling to the authority figure. This, of course, alters the operational 
definitions regarding the behavior of interest. Defined as a subject complying with an 
authority figure (Coleman, 2009), obedience is typically studied under the authority 
paradigm; however, by making the authority figure the subject of interest and by using 
the PDG, the current investigation instead seeks to study dyadic cooperation in which 
equal give and take must facilitate the task.
Just as Milgram (1963) cast participants into the role of a participant as a 
“Teacher” and the confederate as a “Learner,” the current study will cast the participant 
in the role of a “Director” alongside a confederate “Builder” and examine behaviors in an 
experimental setting where cooperative strategies are highly incentivized. However, 
based on the literature on authority, the prediction is that individuals with assigned 
authority will play the cooperative game (i.e. the PDG) more aggressively or defensively 
due to felt superiority and privilege compared to their partner. To test this, changes as a 
result of a cooperative or non-cooperative task in the amount of defecting in a pre-post 
PDG design will be assessed. It is hypothesized that participants in the cooperative
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condition will display more cooperative behavior (as measured by “cooperate” choice in 
PDG) in Trial 2 of the PDG than Trial 1; conversely, those in the non-cooperative 
condition will display higher rates of defecting from pre to post. Additionally, it is 
hypothesized that perceived legitimacy of authority and frustration with one’s partner 
will mediate the amount of defecting.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-eight Montclair State University students (N=38) were recruited from 
introductory psychology courses via SONA systems for class credit. The sample was 
73.70% female with a mean age of 21.24. Additionally, two confederates were utilized 
for the protocol, both of whom were college-aged females. Both were given the same 
standard lines and key scripted behaviors for the procedure.
Procedure
The participants were first given informed consent to read and sign. During this 
time the confederate sat in the same room filling out a dummy informed consent form. 
After informed consent, both the participant and the confederate were guided to a back 
room with a partitioned table and taping equipment set up to record the session for future 
analysis. Here both parties competed in 20 rounds of the PDG for the first trial. For the 
PDG, participants sat facing away from each other across the partitioned table and lifted 
cards that read either “Cooperate” or “Defect” behind the partition to indicate their 
decisions; the researcher stood in the room and recorded participants’ moves. The payoff 
matrix used in both Trial 1 and Trial 2 was as follows: if both parties cooperated (CC), 
then both received one point; if one defected and the other cooperated (DC/CD), then the
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defector gained two points and the cooperator received nothing; if both defected (DD), 
then neither received any points for that round. Nickels were used to represent points as a 
convenient token; use of money or points as a reinforcer in the game does not impact how 
people play it on average (Podd, Marcia, & Rubin, 1970).
After these initial 20 rounds in Trial 1, participants completed three simplified 
models of the Lego Task (Clark & Krych, 2004). In this task, the participant and the 
confederate sat across from each other at the partitioned table; the participant was given 
completed Lego models and the confederate given a box of Lego blocks. The goal of the 
game was for the confederate with the Lego blocks to successfully build a replication of 
the models the participant possessed. The confederate was not allowed to see the models 
nor was the participant allowed to see what the confederate was constructing, thus forcing 
both to rely solely on verbal communication. In the cooperative, or control, condition this 
game was framed as a cooperative task in the instructions and the labels “one” and “two” 
were applied to the one giving directions and the one building the model, respectively. In 
the non-cooperative, or experimental condition, labels of “director” and “builder” were 
assigned to the participants and the instructions for the task emphasized the “authority” 
and epistemological privilege of the director in holding the Lego models and dictating 
instructions (for both sets of instructions, see Appendix A).
The live participant was always assigned the “one” or “director” role in a false 
randomized assignment. Both conditions completed three Lego models on a partitioned 
table before continuing to Trial 2 of the PDG consisting of 20 rounds as well. The 
confederate’s moves were randomly pre-programmed to display an overall cooperation 
rate of 60% for both blocks of 20 with never more than three “defects” or “cooperates” in
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a row (Ingram & Berger, 1977). This programmed strategy was adopted to avoid eliciting 
defecting behavior merely by the plays of confederate and to avoid Nash Equilibrium as 
well, as this would create a statistical ceiling effect.
After the final 20 PDG rounds, points were counted and participants were given 
an end survey (completed in a separate room from the confederate) asking if they felt 
they were in a place of authority, especially legitimate authority, if they wanted to 
cooperate, if they had a clear strategy in mind among other task evaluation questions, all 
rated on a 5 point Likert scale (see Appendix B). After this, participants were given a 
manipulation check, debriefed and given class credit.
Use o f Confederate
Across both conditions the participant in the “two” or “builder” position was, as 
stated above, a confederate. Though the possible risks to validity posed by using a 
confederate in a dialogue setting are acknowledged (see Kuhlen & Brennan, 2013), there 
are three main reasons a confederate was used for this design as opposed to a live partner. 
First, the subject of interest for the purposes of the current study is the behavior of the 
participant in the instructing, or “director,” role. Thus, standardizing the behavior of the 
other member of the dyad could reduce unnecessary statistical noise in the behavior of 
the subject of interest. Another reason to use the confederate is to avoid Nash 
Equilibrium, a phenomenon that, as mentioned earlier, occurs when both parties become 
locked in a defecting deadlock (Khadjavi & Lange, 2013). This would produce a ceiling 
effect for the dependent variable (in this case, number of defects), thus skewing the 
normalcy of the data. Finally, two live participants in a pair create issues for 
independence of observations, thus limiting the use of traditional statistical analyses.
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Using a confederate, and thus eliminating analysis of one member of the pair, avoids this 
problem as the behavior of the confederate can be treated as a constant.
Results
Confirmatory Analyses
A Paired-Samples T Test was conducted on the percentage of defects in Trial 1 
(M = 56.71%) and in Trial 2 (M = 62.76%), regardless of condition. There was a 
significant increase in mean percentage of defects from Trial 1 to Trial 2 of the PDG 
(mean difference = -6.05, t{37) = -3.59,p  = 0.001, Cl = -9.47 -  -2.63). The effect size 
was medium (d = 0.59) and 0.94 power was achieved. For a visual representation see 
Figure 1. A Repeated Measures ANOVA revealed no difference between the control and 
experimental conditions (p = 0.28). See Figure 2 for a visual representation. Thus, in this 
study, the assigned authority condition manipulation had no effect on defecting behavior. 
Exploratory Analyses
A series of analyses were completed in order to investigate any predictive power 
the End of Study Survey displayed for how people played the PDG. For an outcome 
variable, the difference between the final point score in the PDG (as measured in Nickels 
during the experiment) of the confederate and participant was computed. This score 
difference served as a proxy measurement of cooperation in the PDG across both trials -  
the higher the score difference between the confederate and participant, the more the 
participant defected. A Pearson Correlation confirmed this logic, with the total 
percentage of defects across both PDG trials being perfectly correlated with the PDG 
score difference (r = 1.00,/? < 0.001). Given the poor Cronbach’s Alpha the End of Study 
Survey displayed (a = -0.38), the items were treated separately in the following analyses.
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A Pearson Correlation was run on all eight items of the survey plus the computed PDG 
score difference. Of all eight items, only Item 5 (r = 0.51,/? = 0.001), Item 7 (r=  -0.33), 
and Item 8 (r = -0.57,/? < 0.001) were significantly correlated with PDG score difference. 
See Table 1 for correlation matrix.
An Independent-Samples T Test showed no significant differences between men 
and women on any of the dependent variables. A Stepwise Multiple Regression was then 
run using all eight items of the end survey as predictor variables and the PDG score 
difference as an outcome variable to determine if any of the participants’ attitudes about 
the tasks or the confederate predicted cooperation levels. Two models, the first consisting 
of one item and next adding one more item, were derived from the Stepwise Multiple 
Regression. The first model found Item 8 on the survey, which stated “I wanted to 
cooperate with my in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game,” as a significant predictor (R2 =
0.32, R2 change = 0.32, F( 1, 36) change = 17.10,/? < 0.001) of the score difference. The 
second model added Item 5, which states “I had a clear strategy in mind when playing the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game” (R2 = 0.47, R2 change = 0.15, F (l, 35) change = 9.71,/? = 
0.004). In the second model, the regression equation for Item 8 wasy = -3.91* + 14.70, 
indicating that those who disagreed with the item were more likely to defect; the 
regression equation for Item 5 wasy = 3.54x + 14.70, indicating that those who agreed 
with the item were more likely to defect. See Figures 3-5 for a depiction of the linear 
model.
Both of the primary analyses were run again with the removal of outliers (either 
“extreme cooperators” or “extreme defectors”) from Trial 2, leaving a sample of 33. The 
criterion used was to remove those cases that, after viewing the histogram, were
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disconnected from the rest of the distribution at either tail. The overall increase in 
defecting from Trial 1 (M = 56.06 %) to Trial 2 (M = 61.52%) remained intact (mean 
difference = -5.45, ¿(32) = -3.95,p  < 0.001, Cl = -8.27 -  -2.64). Given these new values 
with outliers removed, both effect size (d = 0.69) and achieved power (1 — p = 0.97) 
increased. The Repeated Measures ANOVA measuring the effect of the condition across 
both trials remained non-significant (p = 0.30).
As an additional precaution, an Independent-Samples T Test was run using the 
two confederates as an independent variable and percentage of Trial 1 defects, percentage 
of Trial 2 defects, and score difference as dependent variables. At first, a significant 
difference was found between the two confederates on percentage of Trial 2 defects 
(¿(36) = -3.20, p  < 0.01) and score difference (¿(36) = -2.19,/? < 0.05). However, when 
the same outliers as described above were removed, the effect disappeared for both 
percentage of Trial 2 defects (p = 0.07) and score difference (p = 0.52). Thus, we can 
conclude that, most likely, the initial effect was due to random chance that one of the 
confederates happened to be paired with the extreme defectors rather than due to any 
systematic difference between the two confederates.
Discussion
The purpose of the present research was to show the effect of experimentally 
induced situational authority on a dyadic game in which one could either cooperate or 
compete with the given partner. Ultimately, the study was conducted to further elucidate 
the social-cognitive ramifications of situational authority and to generalize it to real-life 
power structure scenarios (e.g. the police force, political structures, etc.). The findings did 
not show any impact on the number of defects in the second trial from assigning
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authority. Simply put, it seems participants behaved uniformly in the PDG on average 
whether or not they were given a place of authority in the Lego task. The lack of effect 
even held with the removal of outliers, removing the possibility that the tests were 
contaminated by skewed data. It is interesting that the overall increase in defecting from 
Trial 1 to Trial 2 held consistent, however. There are several possible explanations for 
this finding.
It could be that dispositional factors overrode the situational manipulation; in 
other words, personality factors were more salient in PDG and the Lego task 
manipulation was simply too weak to produce a detectable effect (at least with the given 
sample size). In line with the meta-analytic finding of Balliet et al. (2011), we can rule 
out gender as an impactful variable as all gender t tests were not significant and both 
confederates used were female, preserving some level of consistency in the gender dyad 
composition. However, as discussed earlier, personality dimensions such as Reward 
Responsiveness (Pothos et al., 2011) and Machiavellianism (Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014) 
might have impacted strategies participants used in the PDG. Though these personality 
constructs were not directly measured, we can postulate how they might have impacted 
strategy of participants’ based on the end of study survey.
Namely, it is interesting that, despite predictions, no survey items asking about 
role saliency (i.e. felt legitimacy of authority) or view of the confederate predicted PDG 
outcomes; rather, in a much more straightforward result, only the items asking about 
strategy and cooperation predicted the outcome. It is not surprising, though, that of these 
items, it was Item 8 inquiring about cooperation desires that displayed the greatest 
predictive power. Simply put, it seems that those participants who did not want to
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cooperate with their partner indeed did not and vice versa. Adding Item 5, which inquired 
whether the participant had a strategy or not, increased the predictive strength of the 
model but was not as predictive of score difference on its own compared to Item 8.
Again, this makes sense, as the item did not inquire what the content of the strategy was; 
thus, the strategy may not have necessarily been to defect more uniformly across all 
participants, though the results of the regression seem to indicate that high-defecting was 
indeed a popular strategy. Interestingly enough, though negative as would be predicted (r 
= -0.25), the Pearson Correlation between Item 5 and Item 8 was not significant, thus 
limiting the amount of conclusions we can draw about participants’ attitudes toward 
cooperation and strategies utilized.
Back to the broader scope of the study, why is it that some participants did not 
want to cooperate with their partner and why did some claim to be using a clear strategy 
while others did not? As mentioned before, dispositional characteristics such as Reward 
Responsiveness and Machiavellianism might account for these individual differences. 
Pothos et al. (2011) discuss how, as they supported in their results, Reward 
Responsiveness as a disposition would motivate individuals to seek larger payoffs from a 
game such as the PDG. It could be that, due to the structure of the payoff matrix, certain 
participants came to rely on the defect option more as there were no negative 
consequences per se for defecting -  worst case scenario, from the participant’s point of 
view, she would simply not win anything for that round. From this perspective, the defect 
option is simply an easy default strategy that, in the case of this study, presents a random 
interval reinforcement of two points as opposed to one point each time the partner 
(confederate) cooperates. Thus, if there were people in the sample higher on Reward
18
Responsiveness this could explain some of the increase in defecting from Trial 1 to Trial 
2 as these participants would become more aware of the reward structure of the game.
Machiavellianism could have influenced game strategy in a very similar manner. 
If there were participants who were more Machiavellian by nature, they would have been 
more likely to implement a clear strategy and cooperate only conditionally. In their study 
on the topic, Bereczkei and Czibor (2014) did indeed uncover a negative relationship 
between Machiavellianism and a personality measure of cooperativeness, which helps 
elucidate some of the strategic mechanisms at work for such individuals. It could be that 
any individuals with Machiavellian tendencies in the sample became aware, explicitly or 
implicitly, that their partner was (almost naively) cooperating more often than not and 
“seized the opportunity” as it were.
On the other hand, the greater influencing factor could have been the setting and 
structure of the game across the board on individuals. The programmed order of the 
confederate’s moves may have had large impact on the way participants played the game. 
Namely, though the confederate cooperated 60% of the time for both trials following 
Ingram and Berger’s (1977) program schema, more of the defecting moves were in the 
beginning of the trial for Trial 2 as opposed to Trial 1 merely due to the results of the 
move randomization. In fact, the confederate’s first three moves at the beginning of Trial 
2 were defects. These moves may have appeared aggressive or very competitive to 
participants, especially after having just finished a joint communication game like the 
Lego task (Clark & Krych, 2004). This may have motivated many participants to adopt a 
more defensive strategy in Trial 2. This is supported by the fact that averaged across all 
40 rounds participants defected at a 59.74% rate, thus inverting the confederate’s
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programmed move ratio (60% cooperative/40% defecting). The participants may have, 
when encountering any defecting from the confederate, defensively overestimated the 
competitive nature of the confederate, especially in Trial 2 where participant defecting 
increased.
This aforementioned setting and structure could have activated certain 
unanticipated heuristics from participants playing the game. Jones and Zhang (2004) 
discuss how in multiple iteration games (such as the PDG) players must restrict their 
domain of information in order to make rational calculations of what they term sub-game 
perfect equilibria. This may mean the player is basing her decision off the most recent 
moves of the opponent. Using a computational modeling method the researchers 
demonstrate that this can be a functional strategy assuming the opponent is subject to the 
same limitations. In the case of the present study, it could be that participants were trying 
to optimize their decision-making processes by basing their calculations and predictions 
off the most recent moves of the opponent. In their study, Yamagishi et al. (2007) further 
catalogue heuristic strategies participants will activate during the PDG such as the 
matching heuristic, where participants will simply try to play tit-for-tat in order to reach 
an equilibrium of reciprocity. The above heuristics could explain the increase of defects 
from Trial 1 to 2 given the random change in move set distribution of the confederate.
Perhaps some artifact within the PDG not particular to this study can account for 
some of these findings. Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) discuss how researchers have 
historically had a difficult time generalizing results from the PDG, partly due to external 
validity issues with the PDG (e.g. partners not being able to communicate during the 
rounds) and partly due to limitations or unwillingness on the part of the researchers
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themselves to theorize beyond the lab setting. The PDG may unfortunately, though, have 
inherent issues with external validity and ecological validity. That is to say, how often do 
people find themselves engaging in perfectly constructed zero-sum games with readily 
known payoff matrices out in the real world? Pruitt and Kimmel counter this point, 
however, by claiming that this artificial nature of the PDG thrusts participants into an 
“unfamiliar strategic environment,” giving us a window into de novo rational processing 
stripped of everyday heuristics of the game players. Only further, theory-directed 
confirmatory research will reveal whether the constructed nature of the PDG (and other 
social games as well) are to its benefit or its detriment.
Limitations
There are limitations to this study that reduce the conclusions we can make from 
the results. First and foremost, the sample size of 38 was quite small due to time 
limitations. The small sample could explain why no effect was found from the authority 
manipulation. This could also be an explanation for the medium effect size found for 
defect moves increasing from Trial 1 to Trial 2 if statistical noise was introduced into the 
analysis. The achieved power was good (0.94), but this is an ad hoc computed power so it 
can only be taken as an estimation.
Additionally, since both confederates were female, we gained no data on male vs. 
male dyads in the PDG, thus limiting the conclusions we can draw about gender effects.
It must also be mentioned that both confederates, after going through several sessions of 
the experiment, began to memorize the Lego models. Both confederates were instructed 
to play they game as if they had never been exposed to it or the models before; however, 
it was unavoidable that they would become more skilled at the task over time, thus
21
making the task easier for the participant. This may have reduced the effectiveness of the 
authority manipulation by simply making the Lego task too easy.
Future Directions
This topic warrants further research, though certain changes should be made in 
the design. First of all, future researchers using an experimental design similar to the 
present study should re-conceptualize the authority manipulation to make it more salient 
to participants. Possibly a different type of task, such a mock-learning game with 
assigned roles could elicit a stronger behavioral response from participants. Investigating 
the possible effect using other social games, such as the Public Good Game, could also be 
fruitful to the research as this game might remove some the defensive and competitive 
baggage that accompanies the PDG. Finally, relevant personality measures should be 
utilized, such as the Mach-IV, as certain personality measures may play a strong role in 
mediating how susceptible individuals are to the trappings of authority.
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Appendix A
Cooperative Condition
The two of you will now engage in a cooperative building task for three rounds. 
You have both been randomly assigned to your positions for this game beforehand using 
random number generator and your SONA numbers. [Point to participant] you are “1” 
and you [point to confederate] are “2.” The two of you will have to cooperate to complete 
this task [bring models to participant and box o f Legos to confederate]. Participant “1” 
will guide participant “2” in assembling the three models. Participant “1” may not show 
participant “2” the model, nor may participant “1” see the workspace of participant “2.” 
You need to work together to ensure that you have the same understanding. You may ask 
each other questions and interrupt as you would in any conversation. Once you believe 
you have a model finished say ‘finished’ and I will enter the room to check to see that 
both models are indeed identical. The model must be identical in color, shape, and 
orientation. There are three models total to complete. Are there any questions?
Non-cooperative Condition
The two of you will now engage in a building task for three rounds. You have 
both been randomly assigned to your positions for this game beforehand using random 
number generator and your SONA numbers. [Point to participant] you are the ‘Director’ 
and you [point to confederate] are the ‘Builder.’ The builder will have to listen to the 
director to complete this task [bring models to participant and box o f Legos to 
confederate]. The director will dictate to the builder how to assemble the three models. 
The director may not show the builder the model, nor may the director see the workspace 
of the builder. The builder may ask questions for clarification, but the main role is simply 
to listen to the directions of the director. Once you believe you have a model finished say 
“finished” and I will check to see that both models are indeed identical. The model must 
be identical in color, shape, and orientation. There are three models total to complete. Are 
there any questions?
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Appendix B
End o f Study Survey
Respond to each question by circling the number that corresponds best with your 
response. Please do not indicate fractions/decimals for your answer by circling on 
line.
1. I was well suited for my role for the Lego task.
1-----------------2-----------------3-----------------4-----------------5
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
2. I communicated well with my partner during the Lego task.
1—
Strongly disagree
-2------
Disagree
-3----
Neutral
4 ---------------- 5
Agree Strongly agree
3. I feel I performed better than my partner in the Lego task.
1----------------2----------------- 3----------------- 4----------------- 5
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
4. My partner frustrated me when trying to complete the Lego task.
1---------------- 2----------------- 3----------------- 4----------------- 5
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
5. I had a clear strategy in mind when playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
1---------------- 2----------------- 3----------------- 4----------------- 5
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
6. My partner was not courteous in the way he/she played the game.
1---------------- 2----------------- 3----------------- 4----------------- 5
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
7. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game confused me a little bit.
1---------------- 2----------------- 3----------------- 4----------------- 5
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
8. I wanted to cooperate with my partner in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
1---------------- 2----------------- 3----------------- 4----------------- 5
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
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Figure 1. Comparison of mean percentage of defects for Trial 1 and Trial 2 of PDG.
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Condition
Cooperative
Non-Cooperative
Figure 2. Plot of interaction between Cooperative and Non-Cooperative conditions 
across both trials of the PDG on mean percentage of defects (non-significant 
interaction).
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Item 8 Score
Figure 3. scatterplot with line of best fit between PDG score difference and 
responses on Item 8 (“I wanted to cooperate with my partner in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game”) from End of Study Survey.
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Figure 4. Scatterplot with line of best fit between PDG score difference and 
responses on Item 5 (“I had a clear strategy in mind when playing the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game”) from End of Study Survey.
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Figure 5. Combined graphs depicting linear relationship between both Item 8 & 
Item 5 and the PDG score difference.
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End of Study Survey Item Correlations
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 7 Item 8
Score
Difference
Item 1 Pearson Correlation 1 .7 0 5 " -.373’ - .5 6 " .040 .067 .096 .132 .024
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .021 .000 .813 .691 .567 .428 .888
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Item 2 Pearson Correlation .7 0 5 " 1 -.243 - .6 5 " .146 -.040 .021 .154 .123
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .142 .000 .382 .813 .900 .356 .460
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Item 3 Pearson Correlation -.3 7 3 ' -.243 1 .112 .034 -.132 -.289 -.4 6 ” .177
Sig. (2-tailed) .021 .142 .503 .839 .428 .079 .004 .287
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Item 4 Pearson Correlation - .5 6 " - .6 5 " .112 1 -.052 .173 .170 -.176 -.027
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .503 .757 .299 .308 .290 .872
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Item 5 Pearson Correlation .040 .146 .034 -.052 1 -.189 -.249 -.247 .512”
Sig. (2-tailed) .813 .382 .839 .757 .257 .131 .135 .001
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Item 6 Pearson Correlation .067 -.040 -.132 .173 -.189 1 .113 -.091 -.233
Sig. (2-tailed) .691 .813 .428 .299 .257 .499 .586 .159
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Item 7 Pearson Correlation .096 .021 -.289 .170 -.249 .113 1 .320 -.334’
Sig. (2-tailed) .567 .900 .079 .308 .131 .499 .050 .041
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Item 8 Pearson Correlation .132 .154 -.46” -.176 -.247 -.091 .320 1 - .5 6 7 "
Sig. (2-tailed) .428 .356 .004 .290 .135 .586 .050 .000
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Score Difference Pearson Correlation .024 .123 .177 -.027 .5 1 2 " -.233 -.334’ - .5 7 " 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .888 .460 .287 .872 .001 .159 .041 .000
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
•* . Correlation is significant at tire 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 1: Correlation matrix for End of Study Survey items and the PDG score 
difference
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